Southeast Asia is not approaching BRICS as a single bloc.
Singapore, meanwhile, continues to engage major economies through its established trade and investment networks.
The differences are more than diplomatic. Each country has its own economic reasons to engage with emerging economies, from Malaysia’s electronics exports to Indonesia’s mineral processing ambitions. BRICS provides another forum for pursuing these interests, but it does not automatically give participants tariff concessions or guaranteed access to new markets. The question is what each government can secure through the relationship.
The September 2026 New Delhi Declaration identified cooperation in economic and financial affairs, innovation, sustainable development and global governance as shared priorities. It also called for greater participation by partner countries in BRICS activities. While the declaration sets out the group’s ambitions, it does not, by itself, demonstrate new trade or investment gains for individual countries.
Malaysia: Electronics and Export Diversification
Malaysia’s BRICS partnership comes at a time when its manufacturing exports are performing strongly. Total trade reached RM3.061 trillion in 2025, with exports of RM1.607 trillion.
Electrical and electronic products, machinery and equipment, and optical and scientific instruments were among the leading contributors. Palm oil and palm-oil-based products also supported export growth.
ASEAN, China, the European Union and Taiwan recorded high export values, reflecting Malaysia’s integration into established international supply chains.
For Kuala Lumpur, the opportunity is to widen its commercial relationships without weakening those existing links. BRICS engagement could help Malaysian businesses explore demand in additional emerging markets, including opportunities in electronics, industrial equipment and agricultural products.
But Malaysia already uses trade agreements such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to facilitate market access. Partner status should therefore be seen as a diplomatic channel for developing business relationships, not a replacement for agreements that already govern trade.
Thailand: Turning Summit Diplomacy into Business Opportunities
Thailand has been a BRICS partner country since 1 January 2025. Its government has identified trade, investment and tourism as potential areas of cooperation, alongside science, technology and innovation, according to the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At the September 2026 summit, Thailand brought these ambitions into more concrete discussions. Its delegation explored opportunities with Thai private-sector representatives operating in, or considering investment in, India. The sectors discussed included energy, chemicals and packaging, e-commerce and consumer goods, with particular interest in clean energy markets.
These discussions offer a clearer picture of what partner status can do: give officials and businesses a setting in which to build contacts, discuss investment and identify areas for cooperation. They do not yet establish that new deals have been completed. The next measure of progress is whether those conversations lead to contracts, capital investment or stronger distribution networks for Thai companies.
Vietnam: Manufacturing Depends on More Than New Markets
Vietnam’s position is shaped by its role in international manufacturing.
In the first half of 2026, merchandise trade reached US$549.69 billion. Exports totalled US$266.52 billion, while imports reached US$283.17 billion. The United States was the largest export market, at US$86.5 billion, and China was the largest source of imports, at US$115.2 billion. The National Statistics Office attributed the strong import growth partly to demand for production inputs and the expansion of manufacturing, particularly in the foreign-invested sector.
This creates a specific challenge for Vietnam. Its manufacturers need access to export markets, but they also rely on imported components and materials to produce goods for those markets. More engagement with BRICS economies could offer additional sources of investment, suppliers and buyers. Yet Vietnam’s existing trade relationships remain central to how its manufacturing sector operates.
Indonesia: Membership and the Downstreaming Agenda
Indonesia’s full membership gives it a different position from the region’s partner countries. Jakarta can participate as a member in BRICS cooperation while pursuing its domestic priorities, including industrial development and the processing of natural resources.
Mineral downstreaming is particularly relevant. Indonesia wants more value to be created at home from its mineral resources rather than relying primarily on exports of raw materials. Cooperation with BRICS economies could support investment, industrial partnerships and demand for processed products, including materials used in battery and electric-vehicle supply chains. But those opportunities must be assessed project by project. Membership alone does not guarantee financing, technology transfers or new factories.
Financial cooperation is another area to watch. The New Delhi Declaration covers economic and financial cooperation, while BRICS discussions have included ways to strengthen cross-border payment connectivity and the use of local currencies. If arrangements become commercially usable for Indonesian firms, they could provide additional options for settling transactions with participating markets. The actual benefit would depend on implementation, participating banks and the needs of businesses trading across borders.
Indonesia’s challenge is to turn its position inside the grouping into outcomes that support its industrial strategy. Announcements matter less than investment that reaches implementation and produces measurable economic activity.
The Philippines: Influence Through ASEAN
President Marcos attended at the invitation of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and used his address to present ASEAN’s priorities on peace and security, economic prosperity and people empowerment. He also highlighted regional concerns including supply-chain resilience, energy security and food security.
For Manila, the significance was regional as well as national. The Philippines could bring ASEAN’s concerns to a forum involving major emerging economies without changing its formal relationship with BRICS. That matters in areas where Southeast Asian countries share practical interests, such as food supplies, energy and resilient trade routes.
Singapore: A Trade Hub Without BRICS Membership
Singapore offers a useful contrast because its global commercial reach does not depend on BRICS membership. Its role in trade, logistics and finance connects businesses across markets, including those within the BRICS economies.
The country’s September 2026 trade figures illustrate the scale of its external connections. Enterprise Singapore reported a 50.8% year-on-year expansion in total merchandise trade. Non-oil domestic exports grew by 68.4%, with electronics supported by demand for integrated circuits, disk media products and personal computers. Re-exports also remain an important part of Singapore’s trading model, allowing goods to move through the country on their way to other markets.
Singapore’s approach is therefore different from Indonesia’s. It does not need membership in every multilateral grouping to maintain commercial relationships with major economies. Its established infrastructure, financial services and trading networks already support those connections.
What These Differences Mean for Southeast Asia
The region’s approaches reflect different calculations. Malaysia is looking to sustain its role in technology-driven supply chains while exploring new markets. Thailand is using partnership to develop business contacts and discuss investment. Vietnam needs to balance export demand with access to imported production inputs. Indonesia has the opportunity to connect its membership with industrial development, while the Philippines used summit outreach to present ASEAN priorities. Singapore continues to rely on its established role in global commerce.
These choices also show why BRICS should not be treated as a single economic solution for Southeast Asia. The grouping can provide diplomatic access and opportunities for cooperation, but countries still need competitive industries, workable financing, commercial partners and policies that translate discussions into results.
